The national context for transparency-based global environment governance by FLORINI, Ann
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
8-2010
The national context for transparency-based global
environment governance
Ann FLORINI
Singapore Management University, annflorini@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00017
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Environmental Policy Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation




The National Context for Transparency-based Global Environmental Governance Ann Florini
Comment
The National Context for Transparency-




Over the last three decades, the neoliberal transformation in domestic gover-
nance, combined with the globalization of production, has led to the creation
of regulatory voids in both established and emerging markets. Privatization of
goods and services ranging from energy to health care to prisons has required
but has not always fostered new national regulatory mechanisms to ensure
that public goods continue to be provided and that externalities generated by
private businesses are appropriately managed. The globalization of production
by multinational corporations has, moreover, seen the creation of supply chains
reaching deep into developing countries that have less regulatory capacity than
do the home countries of multinational corporations. The global transparency
initiatives described in this special issue reºect multiple efforts to bridge result-
ing gaps.
However, such global governance initiatives do not ºoat free of the state
system. Their efªcacy is likely to be shaped not only by global politics, as out-
lined by the various contributions in this issue, but also by norms and capacities
prevailing within countries, and they will necessarily take effect within diverse
national contexts. Over the past two decades, there has been an extraordinary
transformation in transparency views and practices in numerous countries
around the world. The changes have occurred in rich countries and poor, demo-
cratic and authoritarian. These changes provide the crucial context for under-
standing how the transparency transformation is unfolding in global environ-
mental governance, and what its potential and limits might be. Thus, as a
complement to the other articles in this special issue, which focus on global
transparency measures, the focus here is on disclosure policies and practices at
the national level.
* I am grateful to Saleena Saleem for excellent research assistance with this article.
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National-level Disclosure: Types of Transparency Policies
National transparency rules and policies are of many types, ranging from citi-
zens’ “right to know” laws to proactive disclosure of economically salient infor-
mation to “targeted” disclosure meant to have speciªc regulatory effects. In this
comment, I brieºy note key developments relating to the ªrst two types and
then discuss targeted transparency in some detail, given its central relevance to
environmental governance. In particular, I explore how targeted transparency is
being deployed in the important but diverse national contexts of India and
China.
Right to Know: Towards Citizen Empowerment?
With regard to right to know laws, on the surface the rapid growth in sheer
numbers of laws and policies is impressive.1 From fewer than a dozen at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, some 86 countries now claim some sort of government
disclosure law. Yet buried within this startling growth are signiªcant disparities
in intention, scope, and implementation.
The broad “right to know” laws are most familiar in the form of the US
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and similar laws in a handful of developed
countries. These generally require some pro-active disclosure of government-
held information and provide means for citizens to demand speciªc informa-
tion from governments. Virtually all have signiªcant “exemptions”—arenas of
government-held information to which the transparency laws do not apply.
These exemptions always include some degree of protection for information of
national security importance. In the past two decades, dozens of countries have
adopted laws that in some cases have provisions that are considerably more far-
reaching than those of the US FOIA, which applies only to federal government
agencies.2 One of these is India. The Indian Right to Know law, which originated
in a grassroots movement in the Indian state of Rajasthan, applies to all levels of
government and under some conditions also to the private sector. It covers in-
formation held by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of govern-
ment, and under some conditions also by nongovernmental bodies that are
substantially ªnanced, directly or indirectly, by government funds. This can in-
clude private companies such as privatized public utility companies.3
Since its coming into force, there is some evidence that this Act has helped
to empower citizens and improve government performance.4 Anecdotal ac-
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1. Several NGOs do excellent monitoring and overviews of the state of Freedom of Information
laws around the world. See Vleugels 2008; and Privacy International 2009 (particularly David
Banisar’s regularly updated surveys and maps). Another leading website for information related
to transparency is www.Freedominfo.org.
2. For assessment of broad transparency trends and their implications, see Florini 2007.
3. Ashraf 2008.
4. RTI Assessment & Analysis Group (RaaG) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Infor-
mation (NCPRI) 2009.
counts of how the Act has been used indicate a broad range of applications—
exposing local corruption, pressuring the government to act on complaints
and addresses grievance, and providing information that should already have
been public. India’s combination of a ºourishing NGO sector, free media, and
public outrage in response to exposure of wrong-doing provides the necessary
ingredients to enable the broad right-to-know rules to have signiªcant impact.
Nonetheless, awareness of it is greater in urban rather than rural areas, and im-
plementation problems include bureaucratic obstructions, huge delays in pro-
cessing applications and poor record management.5 Such challenges are likely
to apply to transparency-based governance in diverse national contexts.
In contrast to India, the one-party state in China has taken a very different
route toward a right to know and greater governmental disclosure with its Open
Government Information (OGI) regulations, which came into effect in May
2008.6 At ªrst glance, the regulations are similar to right to know laws around
the world, requiring government agencies to pro-actively release information
and giving citizens the right to receive government-held information, including
environmental information, on request. However, the motivations and drivers
of the Chinese regulations reºect the particularities of a government determined
to manage an increasingly complex and globalized society while keeping politi-
cal control ªrmly in central Party hands.
The apparent contradiction of an authoritarian, one-party state pursuing
open government requires some explanation. The OGI regulations are part of a
larger effort to tackle corruption and improve the efªciency of governmental
service delivery in a rapidly modernizing country. China’s Open Government
Information regulations came about in large part due to elite-driven decisions
that continued economic success—the basis of the legitimacy of the one-party
system—would require “informationizing” China, including not only the
spread of information technology but also greater governmental openness that
would make government more effective and responsive to the needs of citizens.
The regulations do not, however, reºect grass-roots demands for information
and are intended only to allow the citizenry to monitor government perfor-
mance, not to have voice in decisions about what ends government should
serve.
The experiences of India and China reºect patterns seen in scores of coun-
tries over the past twenty years, experimenting with new approaches to informa-
tion disclosure at the national level. The end of the Cold War and the subse-
quent wave of democratization saw new right to know laws sweeping through
much of central and Eastern Europe as well. In such diverse parts of the world as
East Asia and Latin America, democratization has also played a role. In general,
combating corruption and holding public ofªcials accountable are primary
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5. RTI Assessment & Analysis Group (RaaG) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Infor-
mation (NCPRI) 2009.
6. For discussion of the emergence of the Chinese OGI regulations, see Zhou 2007; and Horsley
2007.
goals of right to know laws. Their potency in furthering the goals of governmen-
tal (and private actor) accountability in the environmental domain is a crucial
area requiring further systematic and comparative study.
Pro-active Dissemination of Economically Salient Data
A second category of transparency policies relate to proactive dissemination of
economically salient data. Even countries with limited or no “right to know”
rules increasingly publicize economically salient data. This reºects an emphasis
on transparency as key to efªcient economic operation rather than rights of citi-
zens, thus it needs to be addressed separately. It is quite possible for countries to
rank low on political openness—that is, to deny citizens access to government-
held information—and high on economic transparency—that is, to make pub-
licly available speciªc economic information.
Prior to the 1990s, many countries treated basic economic statistics, in-
cluding such matters as international reserve holdings, as state secrets. However,
the globalization of capital and the growing desire of countries to attract foreign
direct investment have led to new pressures to make such information publicly
available, as investors increasingly demanded such data as a condition of invest-
ment. The push for greater release of economic information has received strong
support not only from such private sector actors but also from the international
ªnancial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which established new standards for “good practices” in this area.7 Countries
such as India, China, Mexico and South Korea are now, to greater or lesser ex-
tent, disclosing economically salient information.8 Disclosure of economically
salient information is thus at the heart of a worldwide push for ªnancial trans-
parency, yet it is fueled by normative imperatives distinct both from the right to
know movement for citizen empowerment and from targeted transparency to
meet speciªc regulatory ends. This third category of transparency policies is dis-
cussed next.
“Targeted” Disclosure
The third category—targeted disclosure requirements—is the most directly rele-
vant to environmental governance. Governments are increasingly turning to dis-
closure as a form of direct regulation, in what can be termed “regulation by rev-
elation.”9 While right to know policies aim to inform the public as an end in
itself, targeted transparency provides information that aims to inºuence
choices. Disclosure-based regulation is not new—it has been the basis for regu-
lation of the US stock market for many decades—but it is now an approach of
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7. International Monetary Fund 2001 and 2004.
8. International Monetary Fund 2001, 2004 and 2006.
9. Florini 1998.
choice for everything from nutritional labeling to airline baggage handling. The
basic idea is simple: rather than requiring the targets of regulation to achieve
speciªc behavioral standards, regulators require that those targets provide infor-
mation about what behavioral standards they are achieving. The public release
of that information is intended to push those targets into behaving in more so-
cially desirable ways. The targets for such policies are typically organizations
that are “viewed as responsible for some public risk or performance problem
(and therefore have unique access to information about it).”10
Targeted disclosure regulation has been used extensively in the environ-
mental ªeld, in such mechanisms as the US Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), and
the related Pollution Release and Transfer Registries now operational in most
OECD countries. The approach represents a “third wave” of environmental reg-
ulation, following difªculties arising from reliance on traditional command
and control regulatory approaches and then limits to the success of the second
wave approach that relied on market-based instruments.
By far the most rigorous work to date on targeted transparency is that of
Fung, Graham, and Weil, who have assessed the conditions under which na-
tional disclosure-based regulation has impacts for which it was designed (al-
though largely in an industrialized country context). They have found that dis-
closure-based regulation works well under three conditions. First, a potential
audience for disclosure exists, one that is making less than ideal choices about a
matter of public concern because of lack of information. Second, potential re-
cipients of information could and would change their behavior if they had ap-
propriate information. Third, the changed behavior would cause disclosers, in
turn, to act in ways desired by regulators.11 When any of these conditions is
missing, government may have to do more than require disclosure to bring
about desired changes in behavior. And even if all conditions are present, regu-
latory systems need to carefully design what information is to be provided, to
whom, in what format, and when, if disclosure is to have a signiªcant impact
on behavior. Indeed, this need for good design applies to transparency-based
governance at all levels of decision-making.12
In considering targeted transparency in non-US contexts, we can again
consider the cases of India and China. Despite its signiªcant moves toward in-
stitutionalizing a domestic right to know law, the Indian government does not
yet rely much on disclosure-based regulation. However, at least one NGO has
pursued the approach directly with industry, with some effects on both corpo-
rate environmental performance and public policy. The Centre for Science and
Environment (CSE) launched a Green Ratings Project in the late 1990s, initially
covering 31 large corporations in the pulp and paper industry. It secured their
participation in providing data on environmental performance in part by
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10. Fung, Graham, and Weil 2007, 41.
11. Weil et al. 2006.
12. Gupta 2008; Mason 2008; and Florini 2008.
threatening to rank last a company that failed to disclose data. Thereafter, the
CSE expanded its scope to cover other sectors such as the car industry.13 One as-
sessment of the experience with the pulp and paper industry component found
that it had been effective in improving the industry’s environmental perfor-
mance.14
In contrast to the relative slowness to embrace regulation by revelation in
India, China is beginning to experiment extensively with targeted disclosure
policies in the environmental area. Article 11 of China’s national Environmental
Protection law requires that the competent administrative department of envi-
ronmental protection under the State Council establish monitoring systems,
constitute monitoring criteria, organize monitoring networks with related de-
partments, and strengthen management of environmental monitoring. The
competent administrative departments of environmental protection under the
State Council, provincial and municipal governments shall regularly publicize
environmental status reports.15
Article Ten of the Chinese State Council’s Decision on Several Issues Re-
lated to Environmental Protection encourages public participation in environ-
mental regulation and deªnes an important role for the news media in publiciz-
ing actions that damage the environment.16 These examples indicate receptivity
to the idea not only of the public’s right to environmental information, but also
of targeted disclosure to achieve behavioral changes.17
Furthermore, local experimentation with disclosure-based regulation ap-
pears to be expanding, as noted in a prominent World Bank study.18 More re-
cently, environmental authorities are looking to draw on the new Open Govern-
ment Information regulations to move in the direction of greater environmental
disclosure. The OGI rules require all government agencies to develop their own
implementing measures. The ªrst to take up the challenge was the Ministry of
Environmental Protection, which issued Measures for Open Environmental In-
formation (for Trial Implementation) (OEI) on 1 May 2008. The Open Envi-
ronment Measures do not yet add up to a full-ºedged targeted disclosure policy,
but they do begin to develop the basis for one with the requirement for report-
ing on emissions. Information to be disclosed includes, for example, “major
pollutants, method, content and total volume of emission, information on
emission that has surpassed the standards or total emission that has surpassed
the prescribed limits; information on the construction and operation of envi-
ronmental protection facilities; and emergency plans for sudden environmental
pollution accidents.”19 The Measures also note that enterprises cannot refuse to
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13. Kathuria 2006.
14. Powers et al. 2008.
15. China Environmental Protection Law 2010.
16. China State Council’s Decision on Several Issues Related to Environmental Protection 2010.
17. Wang et al. 2002.
18. World Bank 2005.
19. State Environmental Protection Administration of China 2007, 6.
disclose environmental information using conªdentiality of trade secrets as a
justiªcation.
Although it is too soon to know whether these Measures will lead to
signiªcant impact, a recent update noted that they have at least served to clarify
who is in charge of granting access to environmental information. The update
also notes that “MEP’s progressiveness on issuing OEI measures is not surpris-
ing, for the environmental sphere has been one of the most progressive in
China—both in terms of policy experimentation and activism. Moreover, these
measures potentially serve to help empower environmental agencies.”20
However, the existence of disclosure policies is one thing—implementa-
tion is another. Here the record is mixed. One recent assessment found consid-
erable variation in local implementation of disclosure policies. A few cases
stand out, such as the release by the city of Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province and
the province of Qinghai of lists of companies polluting and violating relevant
environmental laws, or Zhuzhou city’s (Hunan Province) new requirement for a
monthly Corporate Open Day, on which enterprises must open production pro-
cess, operation status, and environment-related information to the public. Else-
where, however, localities have been far less responsive to the approach.21
Multinational corporations operating in China also have a mixed record
on disclosure. A recent Greenpeace assessment of pollutant emissions disclo-
sures by 28 of global top 100 companies that have business operations in China
found that “only 6 of the 28 companies under investigation have disclosed in-
formation on pollutants emissions on their ofªcial websites; 13 companies re-
leased information on pollutants emissions in other countries or regions
abroad, but not in China.”22
The experiences of China indicate a key aspect of governance by transpar-
ency, i.e. that efªcacy of targeted disclosure approaches to environmental regu-
lation depends heavily on the existence of intermediary groups that can channel
community responses to the disclosed information. Such groups tend to be civil
society organizations, a sector that is notably under-developed in China but one
that is beginning to grow, particularly in the environmental area. One environ-
mental group, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) has ex-
plicitly set itself up to serve as an intermediary between governmental disclosure
requirements and the public. It states with regard to its activities that:
Our organization (. . .) is reªning our water and air pollution database so
that we can update our corporate discharge datasheet after the measures
come into effect. This new data can make IPE’s database more comprehen-
sive, and it will eventually allow users to compare the volume of discharge
by listed polluters. Besides making disclosure mandatory for listed polluters,
the measures also encourage other companies to voluntarily share pollution
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data with the public. IPE believes that it will make far more sense to the pub-
lic if the data disclosed by companies could be published in a consistent and
cross-comparable way. To facilitate a more standardized disclosure, IPE has
created a discharge data disclosure form, which it has distributed to local
and multinational companies.23
Its approach is an example of what may be an important development in the
realm of transparency and the role of intermediaries therein in Chinese envi-
ronmental governance.
Across other national contexts, countries ranging from Korea to Mexico
have, for example, developed pollutant release and transfer registries, in keeping
with a global trend in this direction.24 These developments and many others
highlight the spread of domestic targeted transparency measures as a tool of en-
vironmental governance, opening up an important research frontier relating to
whether desired governance aims are being accomplished.
Conclusion: Local Context Matters
Global measures of environmental regulation by revelation are meant to help
compensate for the large and growing gap between the need to regulate eco-
nomic activities and the capacity and willingness of national governments to
play such a role. Clearly, however, such measures will fare far better in societies
that are hospitable to the idea of transparency and that are familiar with its
practice. Thus, examining the promise of global initiatives needs to be done in
parallel with studies of speciªc national contexts.
The drivers behind the extensive shift toward greater transparency at the
national level are many and varied, so much so that understanding the causes,
and the likely consequences, of the shift becomes a signiªcant challenge. Demo-
cratic transitions play a role in some countries—such as Korea and Mexico—but
are not a factor in already democratic India or authoritarian China. Imperatives
of economic development and neoliberal ideology provide an impetus for dis-
closure of economically salient information, with international ªnancial insti-
tutions pushing hard to induce member governments to release ªscal, mone-
tary, and trade data.
Moreover, the variety of countries that are disclosing information repre-
sent an extraordinary range of regime types, not just advanced industrialized de-
mocracies. Until recently open government, or more broadly open governance,
was a Western and particularly American ideal. The two countries discussed
here—China and India—have taken very different paths towards transparency.
China’s approach is driven by the leadership’s desire to “informationize” the
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Chinese economy, part of a larger effort to transform China into an economic
great power. India’s law arose, on the other hand, from a grassroots movement
of impressive staying power.
It is important to keep these distinctions in mind in considering how
transparency policies might work in diverse national contexts. For example, to
the extent that private voluntary transparency codes aim to attract “green” inves-
tors, national capacity to provide reliable economically salient data will be a
crucial factor. In contrast, global transparency initiatives that aim to empower
citizens need to examine national approaches to citizens’ general right to know
and/or targeted disclosure policies, in order to evaluate how receptive govern-
ment ofªcials and businesses operating in speciªc countries are likely to be to
such initiatives.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the general picture painted here
might indicate a rosy future for disclosure-based approaches to environmental
governance. Despite factors pushing in the direction of greater disclosure, how-
ever, transparency also faces substantial counter-pressures. Bringing about a
meaningful increase in transparency always involves a power struggle. Those
who are currently enjoying the beneªts of obscurity (rent-seeking or just avoid-
ing the hassles of accountability) are loath to renounce the privileges. There are
also legitimate reasons for secrecy under many circumstances—national secu-
rity concerns, corporate proprietary data, and individual privacy concerns all re-
quire a careful balancing of the right to know with the public interest in some
degree of protection of secrecy. Given lack of broadly agreed principles about
where the boundaries of disclosure should lie, transparency policies can also
ping-pong with changes in the domestic political climate.
Even when governments or other actors wish to implement disclosure pol-
icies, they may ªnd it difªcult to do so. Disclosure can be costly and complex,
requiring archiving of materials, training of staff, changes to bureaucratic proce-
dures, and availability of on-going ªnancial and human resources.25 Moreover,
transparency can only disclose information that has been collected by someone.
Hence a key challenge to effective transparency policies is that, in many cases,
relevant information is not collected or does not exist.
In conclusion, transparency is fast spreading but it is far from being a uni-
versal norm. Some 86 countries now have freedom of information laws—but
the majority of the world’s roughly 200 countries lack any such law. And even
where transparency is nominally embedded, rhetoric frequently outstrips real-
ity. Despite the rapid spread of freedom of information laws around the world,
as well as new disclosure policies aimed at intergovernmental organizations and
the growing number of voluntary and mandatory disclosure systems covering
the private sector, many fundamental issues about transparency remain far from
consensual, both within countries and across borders, as also evident from the
global initiatives examined in this issue.26
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In particular, as globalization and privatization shift ever more informa-
tion of public concern into the hands of the private sector, questions of who has
the right to access what information will become ever more signiªcant. In the
absence of any systematic debate on, much less consensus about, what consti-
tutes a public function that the public is entitled to know about (even if the
function is being handled by a private entity), we are currently making do with a
hodgepodge of voluntary standards and occasional mandatory disclosure re-
quirements. This raises a question central for the study of governance by disclo-
sure: how far beyond governments should disclosure obligations extend? A few
national laws, notably India’s, do address the private sector but most do not.
That more systematic debate, within and across countries, is long overdue.
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